



why this zine?

When I started using containers I was SO CONFUSED.




So I decided to learn how they work under the hood!



Now I feel confident that I can solve basically any problem with containers because I understand how they work.

I hope that after reading this zine, you'll feel like that too.




there are only about 10 main ideas! let's go learn them!




table of contents

why containers?4	cqroups	13
the big idea: include EVERY dependency5	namespaces	
EVERY dependency5	how to make a namespace	
containers aren't magic6		
containers = processes7		
container kernel features 8	network namespaces	18
pivot_root 9	container IP addresses	1
layers 10	capabilities	20
overlay filesystems11		
container registries12		


why containers?







- \$./configure
- \$ make all

ERROR: you have version
2.1.1 and you need
at least 2.2.4









the big idea: include EVERY dependency


containers package EVERY dependency together



to make sure this
program will run on
your laptop, I'm going
to send you every single
file you need


a container image is a tarball of a filesystem

Here's what's in a typical Rails app's container:




how images are built

- 0. start with a base OS
- 1. install program + dependencies
- 2. configure it how you want
- 3. make a tarball of the WHOLE FILESYSTEM



running an image

- 1. download the tarball
- 2. unpack it into a directory
- run a program and pretend that directory is its whole filesystem




containers aren't magic


These 15 lines of bash will start a container running the fish shell. Try it! (download this script at bit.ly/containers-arent-magic)


It only runs on Linux because these features are all Linux-only.


```
wget bit.ly/fish-container -O fish.tar
                                            # 1. download the image
mkdir container-root; cd container-root
tar -xf ../fish.tar
                                            # 2. unpack image into a directory
cgroup_id="cgroup_$(shuf -i 1000-2000 -n 1)" # 3. generate random cgroup name
cgcreate -g "cpu,cpuacct,memory:$cgroup_id" # 4. make a cgroup &
cgset -r cpu.shares=512 "$cgroup_id"
                                                 set CPU/memory limits
cgset -r memory.limit_in_bytes=1000000000 \
      "$cgroup_id"
cgexec -g "cpu,cpuacct,memory:$cgroup_id" \ # 5. use the cgroup
    unshare -fmuipn --mount-proc \
                                         # 6. make + use some namespaces
    chroot "$PWD" \
                                            # 7. change root directory
    /bin/sh -c "
        /bin/mount -t proc proc /proc &&
                                            # 8. use the right /proc
        hostname container-fun-times &&
                                            # 9. change the hostname
        /usr/bin/fish"
                                            # 10. finally, start fish!
```


containers = processes











container kernel features

containers use these Linux Kernel features

"container" doesn't have a clear definition, but Docker containers use all of these features.



set a process's root directory to a directory with the contents of the the container image

★ cgroups ★

limit memory/CPU usage for a group of processes





allow processes to have their own:

- → network → mounts
- → PIDs → users
- → hostname + more

★ capabilities ★

security: give specific permissions




security: prevent dangerous system calls

★ overlay filesystems ★

this is what makes layers work! Sharing layers saves disk space & helps containers start faster

pivot_root



chroot: change a process's root directory

If you chroot to /fake/root, when it opens the file /usr/bin/redis, it'll get /fake/root/usr/bin/redis instead.

You can "run" a container just by using chroot, like this:

- \$ mkdir redis; cd redis
- \$ tar -xzf redis.tar
- \$ chroot \$PWD /usr/bin/redis
- # done! redis is running!

programs can break out of a chroot

all these files are whole still there! A root filesystem process can access redis them if it wants. container directory

redis

you can unmount container the old filesystem so it's impossible to access it.

Containers use pivot_root instead of chroot.


directory

to have a "container" you need more than pivot_root


pivot_root alone won't let you:


- → set CPU/memory limits
- → hide other running processes
- → use the same port as another process
- → restrict dangerous system calls

layers









a layer is a directory


\$ 1s 8891378eb*
bin/ home/ mnt/ run/ tmp/
boot/ lib/ opt sbin/ usr/
dev/ lib64/ proc/ srv/ var/
etc/ media/ root/ sys/
files in an
ubuntu:18.04 layer

every layer has an ID


usually the ID is a sha256 hash of the layer's contents

example: 8e99fae2..

if a file is in 2 layers, you'll see the version from the top layer




by default, writes go to a temporary layer



To keep your changes, write to a directory that's mounted from outside the container

overlay filesystems



mount -t overlay has 4 parameters

lowerdir:

list of read-only directories upperdir:

directory where writes should go

workdir:

empty directory for internal use target:

the merged result

upperdir: where all writes go

when you create, change, or delete a file, it's recorded in the upperdir.

usually this starts out empty and is deleted when the container exits

lowerdir: the layers. read only.

you can run
\$ mount -t overlay
inside a container to
see all the lowerdirs
that were combined to
create its filesystem!

here's an example!

\$ mount -t overlay overlay -o
lowerdir=/lower,upperdir=/upper,workdir=/work /merged

\$ ls /upper

cat.txt dog.txt

\$ ls /lower

dog.txt bird.txt


\$ ls /merged


cat.txt dog.txt

the merged version of dog.txt is the one from the upper directory

bird.txt

container registries






images have an ID "leffq2"

and sometimes a tag

like "18.04" or "latest"





I'm going to use the latest official public Redis image to test my code!





at COMPANY


be careful where your container images come from


from RANDOM_PERSON


o. ... 2 months later ...


oh no! RANDOM_PERSON is mining bitcoin on my server!


cgroups















namespaces








PID namespace so ps aux shows different processes!

there's a default ("host" namespace)



processes can have any combination of namespaces

container

I'm using the host network namespace but my own mount namespace!

every process has 7 namespaces

\$ lsns -p 273 NS TYPE

4026531835 cgroup

4026531836 pid

4026531837 user

4026531838 uts

4026531839 ipc

4026531840 mnt


4026532009 net

Tnamespace ID

you can also see a process's namespace with:

\$ ls -1 /proc/273/ns

how to make a namespace






command line tools

- \$ unshare --net COMMAND run COMMAND in a new network namespace
- \$ sudo 1sns list all namespaces
- \$ nsenter -t PID --all COMMAND run COMMAND in the same namespaces as PID

namespace system calls

- ★ clone ★
- make a new process
- **★** unshare ★
- make + use a namespace
- * setns *

use an existing namespace





each namespace type has a

- → man page →
- \$ man network_namespaces

. . .

A physical network device can live in exactly one network namespace

. . .

PID namespaces

the same process has different PIDs in different namespaces


PID in host PID in container
23512
23513
4 PID 1 is
23518
12 special


PID namespaces
are in a tree


host PID namespace
(the root)

child child child

Often the tree is just 1 level deep (every child is a container)







rules for signaling PID 1


from same container:


only works if the process has set a signal handler


from the host:

only SIGKILL and SIGSTOP are ok, or if there's a signal handler

user namespaces







in a user namespace,
UIDs are mapped to
host UIDs

I'm running oh, that's
process wild of the mapped to
12345

The mapping is in
-> /proc/self/uid_map <

Unmapped Users show
Up as "nobody"
create user namespace
\$ unshare --user bash
\$ 1s -1 /usr/bin
.. nobody nogroup apropos
.. nobody nogroup apt
These are "actually" owned by root


but we didn't map any users

how to find out if you have a separate user namespace

compare the results of \$ 1s /proc/PID/ns

between a container process and a host process

network namespaces



namespaces usually have 2 interfaces (+ sometimes more)


- →the loopback interface (127.0.0.1/8, for connections inside the namespace)
- →another interface (for connections from outside)

every server listens on a port and network interface(s)


0.0.0.0:8080 means "port 8080 on every network interface in my namespace"

127.0.0.1 stays
inside your namespace


I'm listening
on 127.0.0.1
o
that's fine, but nobody
outside your network
namespace will be able
to make requests to you!







container IP addresses





This is because they're not directly on the public internet

for a packet to get to the right place, it needs a <u>route</u>



inside the same computer, you'll have the right routes


same computer:

\$ curl 172.16.2.3:8080
<html>....

different computer:

\$ curl 172.16.2.3:8080 no reply

distributing the right routes is complicated





(wow these things change a lot


route table cloud providers have systems to make container IPs work

In AWS, this is called an "elastic network interface"

capabilities








CAP_SYS_ADMIN

lets you do a LOT of things. avoid giving this if you can!

CAP_NET_ADMIN

allow changing network settings




\$ getpcaps PID


print capabilities that PID has

getcap / setcap


system calls: get and set capabilities!

seccomp-bpf










the function decides if that syscall is allowed

example function:

if name in allowed_list {
 return true;
}
return false;
syscall doesn't

Docker blocks dozens of syscalls by default





2 ways to block scary system calls


- 1. limit the container's capabilities
- 2. set a seccomp-bpf whitelist

You should do both!

configuration options








set capabilities

add seccomp-bpf filters



use the host network namespace

usually the default is to use a new network namespace!

Othanks for reading O

I did a bunch of the research for this zine by reading the man pages. But, much more importantly, I experimented -- a lot!



So, if you have access to a Linux machine, try things out! Mount an overlay filesystem! Create a namespace! See what happens!

credits

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Editing: Dolly Lanuza, Kamal Marhubi

Copy editing: Courtney Johnson

Othis?

more at

* wizardzines.com *